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Abstract 
Purpose 
Employing the anti-corruption campaign as an exogenous political shock, this paper examines 
how political intervention shapes the impact of financial expert CEOs on firm investment 
decisions.  
Design/methodology/approach 
This paper uses a sample of 2,808 Chinese firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges from 2003 to 2016. Panel data is used for conducting the analysis controlling for 
firm, industry, and year fixed effects.  
Findings 
We find that CEOs with financial expertise are sensitive to political intervention when making 
investment decisions. First, financial expert CEOs spend more on R&D expenditure in private-
owned companies and they are associated with less R&D expenditure in state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Second, financial expert CEOs are associated with higher investment 
expenditure in general, but they become less likely to invest more in the post-anti-corruption 
period. The reduction in investment expenditure due to the anti-corruption campion is more 
pronounced in SOEs than in private-owned companies. Third, the anti-corruption promotes 
R&D investment in general, but in SOEs, expert CEOs tend to be less likely to invest more on 
R&D after the anti-corruption shock. 
Originality/value 
This paper enriches the growing literature on the impact of political intervention and the role 
of the anti-corruption campaign on corporate behaviour.  
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This study examines whether and how CEO financial expertise affects corporate decision-
making in the presence of strong political intervention. CEO characteristics, such as age, talents, 
behavioural and managerial traits affect corporate decision-making and outcomes (Hirshleifer, 
Low & Teoh, 2012; Malmendier & Tate, 2005, 2008; Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong & Kor, 
2013; Baldenius, Melumad & Meng, 2014). However, there are limited studies exploring the 
influence of CEOs’ financial expertise on corporate investment decisions, especially in a 
setting where political intervention is strong. We employ the anti-corruption campaign initiated 
by President Xi Jinping as an exogenous political shock to examine whether financial expert 
CEOs are influenced by the political policy change when making investment decisions. We 
link financial expert CEOs with the anti-corruption shock because expert CEOs could be less 
sensitive to political intervention due to their expertise and therefore have more confidence in 
financial evaluations. Particularly, we investigate how the anti-corruption campaign shapes the 
impact of financial expert CEOs on both capital and R&D investment decisions, and the 
differential influence of the anti-corruption campaign in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
private-owned companies respectively. 
Political intervention in corporations is a common phenomenon around the world (Faccio, 
2006), and particularly so in China. State ownership dominates Chinese listed firms (Huang 
and Zhu, 2015), and prior research indicates that SOEs are associated with weaker corporate 
governance (Clarke, 2003), lower financial reporting quality and less financial transparency 
(Guedhami, Pittman & Saffar, 2009). Further, Xie (2015) documents that as the Chinese 
government appoints and dismisses top executives in SOEs, the executives tend to pursue 
political goals because they serve the interests of politicians. On the other hand, financial expert 
CEOs influence firm financial performance (Adams & Jiang, 2017), earnings management 
(Gounopoulos & Pham, 2018), reporting and disclosure quality (Kalelkar & Khan, 2016), 




among others. However, to date, little is known about whether CEOs with financial expertise 
are strongly influenced by political interference. We investigate this important research 
question by 1) examining whether expert CEOs are influenced by state controlling owners; 2) 
examining whether expert CEOs are sensitive to the anti-corruption campaign initiated by 
President Xi Jinping; 3) examining whether the campaign shapes the investment decisions of 
expert CEOs in SOEs and private-owned companies differently. The anti-corruption campaign 
is argued to be the most effective anti-corruption effort in the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP)’s history (Lin, Morck, Yeung & Zhao, 2016). Studies indicate that the campaign 
significantly enhances firm value (Xu, 2018) and reduces corporate fraud (Zhang, 2018). 
Following Custódio and Metzger (2014), we define a CEO as a financial expert if the CEO 
has prior finance related experience.1 Using various measures of investment policy, we find 
that financial expert CEOs are associated with higher investment expenditure in general. This 
result is in line with the argument that financial experts may overinvest due to overconfidence 
or the fact that financial experts can reduce the firm’s reliance on internally generated cash 
flows (e.g., Güner, Malmendier, & Tate, 2008). More importantly, our results show that 
political intervention shapes the impact of expert CEOs on investment decisions. We first find 
that financial expert CEOs behave differently in SOEs and private firms. Expert CEOs spend 
more on R&D expenditures in private firms, but they reduce R&D investment in SOEs. We 
argue that such difference may result from the political or social concerns in SOEs, which may 
reduce expert CEOs’ incentive for risky innovative activities. For example, Lin, Liu, and Sun 
(2017) find that Chinese SOEs have fewer incentives for innovation and spend less on R&D 
investment. Second, financial expert CEOs are sensitive to the anti-corruption campaign as 
 
1 CSMAR Listed Firm’s Figure Characteristic database provides the work experience of top 
management.  Finance-related occupational background includes work experience in regulatory 
commission, policy bank, commercial bank, insurance company, securities company, fund 
management company, securities depository and clearing company, futures company, investment 
bank, trust company, investment management company, Exchanges and others. 




they become less likely to invest more in the post-anti-corruption period. Third, the reduction 
in investment expenditure due to the anti-corruption campaign is more pronounced in SOEs 
than in private firms. Our results indicate that expert CEOs become more conservative and tend 
to invest less in the post-anti-corruption period, which is particularly true in SOEs where 
political interference is stronger. Our results highlight the role of political intervention in 
corporate decision-making of financial expert CEOs. 
This study contributes to the current literature as follows. First, we enrich existing studies 
on how CEOs’ working experience influences corporate investment policies. We find that 
financial expert CEOs are associated with higher investment expenditure in general and they 
influence R&D investment decisions. Second, we add to the literature concerning the impact 
of political intervention and the role of the anti-corruption campaign on corporate behaviour. 
Our results show that the anti-corruption campaign reduces investment expenditure but 
promotes innovative activities. Importantly, our study shows that the increased conservatism 
due to the anti-corruption campaign is more significant when the political intervention at the 
firm-level is stronger. The reduction in investment expenditure due to the anti-corruption 
campaign is more pronounced in SOEs than in private-owned companies. We argue that this 
difference is due to the political goals associated with SOEs. For example, the Chinese 
government facilitates employment and regional development via SOEs, which affects their 
investment behaviour (Chen, Sun, Tang & Wu, 2011). Furthermore, we find that financial 
expert CEOs are associated with higher R&D investment only in private firms. Although the 
campaign promotes innovation in general, in SOEs, expert CEOs tend to be less likely to invest 
more on R&D after the anti-corruption shock. This result supports the argument that SOEs 
have fewer incentives to innovate (Lin et al., 2017).  




Our study has important managerial and social implications. Financial expert CEOs, who 
could be less sensitive to political intervention, are found very sensitive to the anti-corruption 
shock and the sensitivity is more pronounced in SOEs in which political goals are attached to 
top executives. Literature suggests that political intervention may misallocate resources as 
political goals often differ from market-oriented goals (Allen et al., 2005; Che & Qian, 1998). 
Corruption creates huge unfairness and uncertainties in the business environment, and therefore, 
how to reduce corruption can be critical to sustainable economic development in China. Our 
evidence indicates that an anti-corruption event can enhance firm innovation, but the effect is 
reduced by state ownership intervention. 
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature 
related to CEO’s financial working experience, state control and the anti-corruption campaign. 
Section 3 summarises the data and variable construction. Section 4 describes the research 
design and reports the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. CEO’s financial working experience, political intervention and firm investment 
decisions  
2.1 Financial experts and firm investment decisions 
Literature demonstrates that managers’ working experience is an important factor that 
affects firm behaviour and outcomes. Several studies focus on executive’s financial experience 
and firm investment decisions. For instance, Güner et al. (2008) study the impact of directors’ 
banking experience on corporate decisions and find that the sensitivity of investment on cash 
flow is reduced when bankers join the board. In addition, Güner et al. (2008) also find evidence 
that bankers on the board help to increase lending and tend to facilitate overinvestment. 
Custódio and Metzger (2014) show that financial expert CEOs have a lower investment-cash 
flow sensitivity because they have better external financing sources. Similarly, existing studies 




also indicate that CEOs’ financial expertise affects firm financial performance (Adams & Jiang, 
2017), earnings management (Gounopoulos & Pham, 2018), and financial disclosure quality 
(Kalelkar & Khan, 2016). Although firms may benefit from hiring executives with certain 
abilities, influential managers who have high ability may become overconfident and become 
associated with higher agency costs (Custódio & Metzger, 2014), which in turn affects 
investment decisions.  
Besides capital investment, it is also important to explore the relation between managers’ 
experience and firms’ R&D investment decisions. R&D investment as a key input of 
innovation is a crucial factor in strengthening the financial system, improving economic and 
productivity growth, and boosting globalisation in modern economies (Borisova & Brown, 
2013; Corrado, Haskel, Jona-Lasinio & Iommi, 2013; Marrano, Haskel & Wallis, 2009). 
Further, R&D influences firms’ cash holdings and increases competitive advantages (Falato, 
Kadyrzhanova & Sim, 2013; Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006). However, by its very nature, R&D 
investment is typically a risky investment (Wang & Thornhill, 2010), especially when 
compared to capital investment (Wang & Thornhill, 2010). Custódio and Metzger (2014) find 
that financial expert CEOs invest less in R&D and are associated with less patent and citations, 
suggesting that expert CEOs tend to be conservative towards investing in innovation. They 
argue that financial expert CEOs only invest in profitable innovations that have a high 
likelihood of success. Therefore, financial expert CEOs are more cautious towards R&D 
investment due to the greater uncertainties involves and longer investment horizon for R&D.  
Based on the prior literature discussed above, financial expert CEOs are more likely to be 
overconfident compared to non-financial expert CEOs. Further, they are less sensitive to 
internally generated cash flows due to better access to external financing. Meanwhile, financial 
expert CEOs tend to be more cautious towards investment in innovation. Therefore, we expect 




that financial expert CEOs tend to be associated with higher investment expenditure but lower 
R&D investment. As such, we propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: Financial expert CEOs are positively associated with investment expenditure. 
Hypothesis 1b: Financial expert CEOs are negatively associated with R&D investment. 
2.2 The impact of political intervention on firm investment decisions 
Political intervention affects the economy by regulations, laws and the authority over key 
resources (Cao, Pan, Qian, & Tian, 2017; Hao & Lu, 2017). Moreover, political intervention 
may misallocate resources as political goals often differ from market-oriented goals, and such 
intervention may affect firm decision-making (Allen et al., 2005; Che & Qian, 1998). Hence, 
we discuss how political intervention shapes investment decisions of financial expert CEOs in 
the following section. 
2.2.1 State versus private ownership 
The government affects firm operations through various channels including ownership 
structure. The Chinese government maintains control of listed firms through holding state 
ownership, keeping authority over resource allocation and nominating top executives in listed 
SOEs (Cao, Pan, Qian & Tian, 2017). Such influence may misallocate market resources and 
affect firm decision-making, especially in the presence of a weak legal and institutional 
environment (Allen, Qian & Qian, 2005). For instance, using the sensitivity of investment 
expenditure to investment opportunities as the proxy for investment efficiency, Chen et al. 
(2011) find that investment is less sensitive to investment opportunities in SOEs. It is also 
found that politically connected CEOs lead to overinvestment in SOEs (Chen et al., 2011). Hao 
and Lu (2017) find that government intervention reduces investment efficiency, and the effect 
is more significant in local SOEs. Further, Chen, El Ghoul, Guedhami and Wang (2017) find 




that firms with state ownership invest more but are negatively associated with investment 
efficiency.  
As the Chinese government can select or dismiss SOE executives, CEOs tend to pursue 
political outputs for their government taskmasters (Cao et al. 2017, Chen et al. 2011, and Xie 
2015). Hence, politically connected CEOs may prioritise political and social concerns which 
crowd out the shareholders’ goal of wealth maximisation. Cao et al. (2017) find that politically 
connected CEOs have a longer tenure and lower forced turnover probability compared with 
non-politically connected CEOs, even though they have a negative impact on firm value. Cao 
et al. (2017) further document that forced turnover of politically connected CEOs is associated 
with less firm performance improvement, and such CEOs can weaken disciplinary mechanisms.  
As the political intervention is stronger in SOEs than in non-SOEs, we expect that financial 
expert CEOs’ investment decisions differ in SOEs and non-SOEs. Hence, we propose the 
second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Financial expert CEOs have different influences on investment decisions in 
SOEs and private-owned firms. 
2.2.2 The anti-corruption campaign 
Corruption is a common phenomenon around the world. However, its impact on 
corporations is still inconclusive. Even though corruption may enhance firm performance by 
giving better access to scarce resources, corruption has a negative impact on economic growth 
and social development (e.g., Li, Xu, & Zou, 2000; Mauro, 1995; Méndez & Sepúlveda, 2006; 
Méon & Sekkat, 2005). By receiving bribery, government officials may alleviate firms from 
unfavourable regulations or competitive pressures (Jiang & Nie, 2014). Jiang and Nie (2014) 
find that corruption is positively associated with firm profitability. Similarly, studies show that 
corruption may help with firm growth (Vial & Hanoteau, 2010; Wang & You, 2012) and 




increase firm performance (Williams, Martinez-Perez, & Kedir, 2016). However, corruption 
can create huge unfairness and uncertainties in the business environment, which restricts firms 
from making long-term strategies (Athanasouli & Goujard, 2015). Corruption culture is found 
to induce firm opportunistic behaviour (Liu, 2016). Further, establishing corruption 
connections is costly, with firms would expending substantial resources on such connections 
rather than sustainable development (Giannetti, Liao, You, & Yu, 2020). In line with this 
argument, the literature illustrates that corruption decreases firm performance (Giannetti et al., 
2020; Van Vu, Tran, Van Nguyen, & Lim, 2018), hampers management quality (Athanasouli 
& Goujard, 2015), and reduces firm productivity (Lu, Zhang, & Meng, 2021). 
Corruption has been a widespread issue in China since the late 1970s due to the 
decentralisation of administrative duties to local government officials (Giannetti et al., 2020). 
Given that local officials allocate state-owned resources, both private-own companies and 
SOEs have more incentives to build up connections with officials to receive preferential 
treatment, which aggravates corruption severity. To fight corruption in China, President Xi, the 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) introduced China’s most significant 
anti-corruption campaign in 2012. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) 
is the primary body that enforces the inner-party supervision system and acts as the leading 
agency in the battle against corruption. Following the anti-corruption campaign, CCDI 
dispatches central inspection teams to government entities or agencies in different provinces to 
investigate corruption cases and scrutinise politicians. According to Zhang (2018), only 6 to 8 
provincial-level officials had been investigated and arrested annually before the anti-corruption 
campaign. However, by the end of 2014, the number of provincial-level officials under 
investigation had risen to 41 (Zhang, 2018). Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist 




Party of China (NCCPC), 240 high-ranking2 corrupt officials and over 1,199,000 officials at 
all levels were arrested as of March 2018 (Gan & Xu, 2019). Studies such as Cao, Julio, Leng, 
and Zhou (2014) and Piotroski, Wong, and Zhang (2015) indicate that government and party 
officials have a significant influence on firms in China. All types of firms, such as SOEs and 
private-owned companies, in the market are affected by the anti-corruption campaign (Lin, 
Morck, Yeung & Zhao, 2016). Studies reveal that the anti-corruption campaign has a positive 
impact on the financial market in China (Kim, Li, & Tarzia, 2018), which significantly reduces 
corporate fraud (Zhang, 2018) and enhances firm value (Xu, 2018).  
The literature also documents that investment behaviour is affected by the anti-corruption 
campaign. According to Zhang, An, and Zhong (2019), corruption can misallocate market 
resources and lead to rent-seeking activities. As a result, a firm’s connections with the 
government can influence its access to government subsidies and eventually affect its 
investment decisions. As the enforcement of the anti-corruption campaign alleviates the 
potential for rent-seeking activities (Manion, 2016), the anti-corruption campaign is likely to 
promote more effective resource allocation. Pan and Tian (2020) find that both investment 
efficiency and investment expenditure are significantly affected by the ousting of corrupt 
bureaucrats, and such influences are more pronounced following the anti-corruption campaign. 
Zhang et al. (2019) show that the anti-corruption campaign improves subsidy allocation 
efficiency and effectively restricts overinvestment. Hence, due to the pressures associated with 
the anti-corruption campaign, firms are likely to reduce capital expenditure following the anti-
corruption shock.  
The anti-corruption campaign affects not only capital investment but also innovation 
activities. The incentives of rent-seeking associated with corruption are likely to deplete 
 
2 High-ranking refers to government officials of provincial and ministerial-level and above. 
 




financial resources and discourage corporate innovation (Gan & Xu, 2019; Murphy, Shleifer, 
& Vishny, 1993). Corruption can increase the cost of engaging in innovative activities such as 
bribes for granting patents (Paunov, 2016; Xu and Yano (2017). In addition, the expropriation 
by corrupt officials may reduce the expected returns of innovation, which in turn aggravates 
the risks related to innovative projects (Xu & Yano, 2017). As such, an effective campaign to 
stamp out corruption should encourage innovative activities. 
As discussed above, corruption has a significant impact on firm capital and innovative 
investment decisions. Since the anti-corruption campaign imposes enormous pressures on 
government officials and their related parties, we expect that the anti-corruption campaign 
reduces capital investment but promotes investment in innovative activities. Therefore, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3a: The anti-corruption campaign reduces investment expenditure but promotes 
R&D investment. 
Furthermore, the Chinese government retains ultimate control over the appointment and 
removal of top executives in SOEs (Xie, 2015). Therefore, to maintain the position in SOEs, 
CEOs have incentives to bribe government officials who are authorised to appoint top 
executives. It is found that in Chinese SOEs, the likelihood that a top executive receives a 
political promotion is positively related to firm’s entertainment and travel costs (Cao, Lemmon, 
Pan, Qian and Tian, 2019). Therefore, the likelihood of corruption tends to be higher in SOEs 
than in private-owned firms. In addition, CEOs in SOEs may misallocate resources to pursue 
political goals, which differ from market-oriented goals (Allen et al., 2005). According to 
Huang and Li (2019) and Tian and Zhang (2018), in response to the anti-corruption campaign, 
executives in SOEs are more strictly supervised and investigated concerning issues such as 
capital investment. CEOs in SOEs who are concerned about the anti-corruption investigation 




will become very conservative on their decisions. Consequently, they are less likely to invest 
in new capital projects after the shock (Xu, 2018). Huang and Li (2019) argue that the anti-
corruption campaign encourages executives’ conservative behaviours in SOEs. As such, we 
propose that CEOs’ sensitivity to the anti-corruption shock is stronger in SOEs than in private-
owned firms, which leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3b: The impact of the anti-corruption campaign on investment decisions is 
stronger in SOEs than in private-owned firms  
3. Data and variable construction 
 
3.1 Data 
Data for all Chinese listed firms in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 
2003 and 2016 are obtained from the China Securities Markets and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database. The sample period starts from 2003 for the reason that the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) requires all listed firms to disclose their controlling 
ownership information in their annual reports from that year (Liu & Tian, 2012). We exclude 
the observations from the financial sector and those with missing information and delete the 
top and bottom percentile of observations. The final sample includes 2,808 listed firms, 
consisting of 18,222 firm-year observations.  
3.2 Variable construction 
3.2.1 CEO financial expertise 
We define a CEO as a financial expert if the CEO has finance-related occupational 
background (Custódio & Metzger, 2014). Finance Expert is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the CEO is a financial expert, and zero otherwise. Following literature (Cao et al., 2017; Chang 
& Wong, 2009; Custódio & Metzger, 2014), we control for other CEO characteristics including 




CEO Age, CEO Gender, CEO Duality, and CEO Tenure. CEO Age is calculated as the natural 
logarithm of the CEO’s age. CEO Gender is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is male, 
and zero otherwise. CEO Duality is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO also serves as 
the Chairman of the Board in the firm, and zero otherwise. CEO Tenure is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of the number of years the CEO has been in the current position. 
3.2.2 Investment expenditure 
Following Chen et al. (2011), investment expenditure (INV) is calculated as cash payments 
for fixed assets, intangible assets, and other long-term assets from the cash flow statement 
minus cash receipts from selling these assets, scaled by lagged total assets. To further study 
whether financial expert CEOs are associated with entering new businesses or quitting existing 
businesses, we use Buy Ratio as the proxy for entering new businesses and Sell Ratio as the 
proxy for quitting existing businesses (Xie, 2015). Buy Ratio is calculated as the cash flow for 
purchasing fixed assets, intangible assets, and other long-term assets divided by total assets at 
the beginning of each year. Sell Ratio is calculated in the same manner using the cash inflow 
from selling those assets instead. 
Following Shen, Luo and Huang (2015), we use two approaches to measure 
overinvestment. The first approach is to use the differences between a firm’s investment 
expenditure and industrial average investment expenditure in the corresponding year as the 
proxy for abnormal investment. AdjINV refers to the differences between a firm’s investment 
expenditure and the industrial investments in any observation year. AdjINV-Over is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the AdjINV difference is positive, and zero otherwise. AdjINV-Over 
represents overinvestment. 
The second approach is to use the residuals from the investment model as the proxy for 
abnormal investment, given residuals represent the deviation of a firm’s predicted investment 




expenditure from its actual investment expenditure. Similar to the first approach, we define 
positive residuals as overinvestment. Following Shen et al. (2015), we perform the investment 
model that contains only cash flow and investment opportunities to obtain residuals, the model 
is specified as 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀             
where INV refers to investment expenditure; Q represents investment opportunities 
(Tobin’s Q), which is calculated as the ratio of the sum of market value of tradable shares, book 
value of non-tradable shares and liabilities to book value of total assets. CF refers to a firm’s 
net operating cash flow divided by total assets at the beginning of each year. SimINV refers to 
the residuals estimated from the model above. SimINV-Over is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the residual from the simple investment model is positive, and zero otherwise.  
3.2.3 R&D investment 
We use R&D expenses as our first proxy for R&D investment (R&D), which is the ratio 
of R&D expenses to lagged total assets. We then apply a wider definition of intangible assets 
investment for robustness checks. Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005) and Corrado et al. (2013) 
use the sum of nine different types of intangible-related assets from the categories of 
computerized information, innovative property, and economic competencies as the proxies for 
intangible assets. We therefore define and calculate three types of intangible assets investment 
following the existing literature. Computerized Info is the expenses related to the “knowledge 
embedded in computer programs and computerized databases” (Corrado et al., 2005, p.23). It 
is measured by the ratio of expenses of computer software and databases to total assets at the 
beginning of each year. Innovation Property is calculated as the total expenses of science and 
engineering R&D, mineral exploration, copyright and license, product development, design, 
and research divided by total assets at the beginning of each year. Economic Competencies 




addresses the costs of a firm’s human capital and organizational activities, such as employee 
training costs and corporate culture development costs. It is calculated as the sum of a firm’s 
brand equity costs, firm-specific human capital costs, and organizational structure costs divided 
by total assets at the beginning of each year. We also use the sum of Computerized Info, 
Innovation Property, and Economic Competencies as a measure for total intangible assets 
investment, which is denoted as Intangible Assets. 
3.2.4 Political intervention 
 We first proxy political intervention through ownership structure (Chen et al., 2011; Liu 
and Tian, 2012). We construct a dummy variable State, which equals one if the firm’s ultimate 
controlling shareholder is an SOE, central government, local government, or governmental 
institution, and zero otherwise. Second, due to the significance of the anti-corruption campaign 
initiated by President Xi in late 2012, we construct a dummy variable Xi Effect, which is equal 
to one if the observation year is 2013 and onwards, and zero otherwise. 
3.2.5 Other controls 
We control for firm-specific variables. Size refers to the natural logarithm of total assets. 
ROA is the proxy for firm performance, which is the ratio of net income to total assets. Stock 
Return refers to the annual stock return. List Age refers to the natural logarithm of the number 
of years that the firm has been listed. Board Size is the natural logarithm of total number of 
directors on the board. Board Independence is the proportion of independent directors on the 
board. Concentration refers to the percentage of shareholding held by the largest shareholder. 
Chairman Exp is a dummy variable equal to one if the Chairman of the Board has finance-
related background, and zero otherwise. Director Exp is a dummy variable equal to one if at 
least one of the independent directors on the board has finance-related background, and zero 
otherwise. Appendix A reports the definitions for all variables in this study. 




3.3 Summary statistics 
We report the descriptive statistics for key variables in Table 1. The proportion of financial 
expert CEOs in our sample is 15.7%. There is an upward trend in the presence of financial 
expert CEOs throughout the sample period with the ratio reaching 19.4% in 2016 (Figure is 
available upon request). Such a trend of recruiting expert executives is in line with China’s new 
cadre selection and promotion system.3 The investment expenditure shows a downward trend 
since 2011, while there is an upward trend in R&D investment since 2009 (Figure is available 
upon request). Such trends are consistent with the U.S. evidence that intangible investment is 
becoming increasingly critical to firm decision-making (Borisova & Brown, 2013; Falato, 
Kadyrzhanova, & Sim, 2013). However, compared with the investment expenditure, R&D and 
other types of intangible investment represent only a small proportion of total assets.  
The proportion of Chairman of the Board who has finance-related background is 16.6%, 
while 40.4% of sample firms have at least one independent director who is a financial expert. 
The average age of CEO is 48, with the maximum age of 79 and the minimum of 25. Male 
CEOs dominate the sample (94.5%) and approximately 23% of CEOs also serve as the 
Chairman of the Board. The average number of years that the CEO has been in the position is 
3.6 years, and the tenure ranges from one to twenty years. Descriptive statistics also indicate a 
high ownership concentration in sample firms. On average, the largest shareholder holds 
around 38% of total shares. In addition, almost half (48.9%) of sample firms are state-
controlled. 
 
3 The policy of four modernizations of cadres is the principle to promote more revolutionary, younger, 
better educated and more professional officials, this principle also applies to top executives of listed 
SOEs. The policy is a part of Four Modernizations written in Article 35, Chapter VI, Constitution of 
the Communist Party of China (2017 Version).  




In Panel B, we report the t-test results regarding the differences between the subsamples 
with/without expert CEOs. Firms with/without an expert CEO differ in terms of the firm-
specific variables. For example, firms with expert CEOs are large, well-performing firms with 
higher Tobin’s Q, higher stock return and smaller board size. These results also suggest the 
need to control for possible sample selection bias in the non-experimental setting in this study. 
The pairwise correlation matrix does not suggest any serious multicollinearity concerns in this 
study.4  
Insert Table 1 here 
4. Research design and empirical results  
This section discusses the research design and methodologies employed in this study and 
reports the empirical results. 
4.1. Financial expert CEOs and investment decisions 
Based on the relevant literature (e.g., Chen et al., 2011; Custódio & Metzger, 2014), we 
develop our baseline firm fixed effects regression model (Eq. 1) as follow: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽11𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽12𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽13𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖
+ 𝛽14𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽15𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽16𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽17𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖
+ ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟                                                                                     (1) 
We control for industry and year fixed effects in Eq.1, and Table 2 reports the baseline 
regression results. In Column (1) of Table 2, we use INV as the dependent variable. Consistent 
with our expectation, the significantly positive coefficient on Finance Expert indicates that 
financial expert CEOs are associated with more investment expenditure. In addition, SOEs are 
 
4 The results are not tabulated and available on request.  




associated with less investment expenditure. Firms with higher investment opportunities 
(proxied by Q) and internally generated cash flows (CF) spend more on investment expenditure. 
Large and well-performing firms are associated with more investment expenditure. We also 
find firms that have been listed for longer are associated with less investment expenditure. To 
examine whether financial expert CEOs affect entering new or quitting existing businesses, we 
replace INV with Buy Ratio and Sell Ratio in Columns (2) and (3). In Column (2), the 
coefficient on Financial Expert is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting financial 
expert CEOs are positively related to entering new businesses. Using Sell Ratio as the 
dependent variable in Column (3), the coefficient on Financial Expert is not significant.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
Table 3 explores whether financial expert CEOs tend to overinvest. AdjINV-Over and 
SimINV-Over are applied in Columns (1) and (2) incorporating with the probit regression. We 
also construct AdjINV-Over-75/SimINV-Over-75, which is the dummy variable if 
AdjINV/SimINV is greater than 75% of the sample observations, and zero otherwise. The 
positive and significant coefficient on Financial Expert is found in Column (2) of Table 3 when 
SimINV-Over is used as the overinvestment measure. That is, the presence of a financial expert 
CEO in a firm increases the probability of overinvestment by 6.3%, assuming other influences 
remain unchanged. Similar to Table 2, we find large and well-performing firms tend to over-
invest. However, results are inconsistent regarding the relationship between CF and 
overinvestment measures, e.g. CF is positively related to AdjINV-Over but negatively related 
to SimINV-Over. 
Insert Table 3 about here 




Overall, the results in Tables 2 and 3 support Hypothesis 1 that financial expert CEOs are 
associated with higher investment expenditure compared with non-expert CEOs. We fail to 
find strong evidence that expert CEOs are associated with overinvestment. 
4.2. Financial expert CEOs and R&D investment 
Performing the same OLS analysis and using R&D investment as the dependent variable, 
we do not find significant relationships between expert CEOs and R&D expenses and the 
specified categories of intangible assets investment in Columns (1) to (4) as reported in Table 
4. We find expert CEOs are positively and significantly associated with Economic 
Competencies, which addresses the costs of a firm’s human capital and organizational activities, 
such as employee training costs and corporate culture development costs. Additionally, results 
show that firms with higher CF and Q are related to higher R&D and intangible investment. 
Firm Size, ROA, List Age, and CEO Tenure are all positively related to R&D expenditure, while 
CEO duality, Chairman Exp and Stock Return are negatively related to R&D investment. The 
results in Table 4 do not provide strong evidence that expert CEOs influence R&D investment 
in general. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
4.3. Financial expert CEOs and investment efficiency 
Following the literature (e.g. Pan and Tian, 2020), we further study the relation between 
financial expert CEOs and investment efficiency by adding the interaction Finance Expert×Q 
in the regression model of Table 2. We define investment efficiency using the sensitivity of 
investment expenditure to investment opportunities, captured by the interaction Finance 
Expert×Q. Additionally, it is argued that firms having financial experts may overinvest due to 
experts’ overconfidence or the fact that experts can reduce the firm’s reliance on internally 
generated cash flows (e.g., Güner et at., 2008; Malmendier & Tate, 2005). It has been 




documented that firms having commercial bankers as executives are associated with 
overinvestment as such executives have networks through which to access extra funds (Güner 
et al., 2008). We add an interaction Finance Expert×CF in the baseline regression to address 
the above argument. 
Column (1) of Table 5 shows that the coefficients on Finance Expert and CF are still 
positive and significant. The coefficients on the interaction terms, Finance Expert×Q and 
Finance Expert×CF, are both negative but insignificant, so we fail to find evidence that 
financial expert CEOs are sensitive to investment opportunities or internal cash flows when 
making investment expenditure decisions.  
We then add State×CF and State×Q in Column (2) to test the investment-cash flow and 
investment-growth opportunity sensitivity in SOEs when making investment expenditure 
decisions. Interestingly, we find positive coefficients on both interactions, indicating SOEs 
exhibit higher sensitivity to cash flows and growth opportunities. These results are opposite to 
existing results. For example, Chen et al. (2011) find that investment is less sensitive to 
investment opportunities in SOEs. The negative impact of government ownership on 
investment efficiency is also evidenced in Chen et al. (2017). We argue that this may be due to 
the time effects. In our sample period, the anti-corruption campaign may have a significant 
impact on firm investment behaviour, especially in state-controlled firms. We check and 
discuss the robustness of these results in later sections.  
We add the interactions Finance Expert×CF and Finance Expert×Q in Columns (3) to 
examine whether expert CEOs are sensitive to internally generated cash flows and investment 
opportunities when making R&D investment decisions. 5  It shows that the coefficient on 
 
5 We use Total Intangible as the dependent variable and find similar results. The coefficient on 
Finance Expert is negative and significant at the 5% level. CF and Q are both significantly positive 
and the coefficient on Finance Expert×Q is positively significant at the 10% level. 




Finance Expert is negative and significant at the 10% level, CF and Q are both significantly 
positive. Interestingly, the coefficients on Finance Expert×CF and Finance Expert×Q are 
positive and significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. The results are in line with 
Custódio and Metzger (2014) who argue that financial expert CEOs may only invest in 
profitable innovation projects, which have strong evidence of success (captured by the 
interaction Finance Expert×Q in this study). We add State×CF and State×Q in Column (4) to 
test whether state controllers are sensitive to internally generated cash flows and growth 
opportunities when making R&D investment decisions. We find negative coefficients on both 
interactions, indicating the inefficiency of state control when making R&D investment 
decisions. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
4.4. Political intervention 
In this section, we examine whether the relationship between expert CEOs and corporate 
investment decisions are shaped by political intervention.   
4.4.1. State versus private ownership 
In China, a large portion of the economy is controlled by the Chinese government through 
state ownership (Cao et al., 2017; Xie, 2015), which is in line with our sample statistics that 
around half of listed firms are identified as SOEs. Thus, we use state ownership as the first 
measure of political intervention and conduct subsample analysis to examine whether financial 
expert CEOs behave the same in SOEs and private-owned firms. 
We divide sample firms into the SOE subsample where the controlling shareholder is an 
SOE or government agency, and the Non-SOE subsample where the controlling shareholder is 
a private firm or individual person. Columns (1) to (4) of Table 6 reports the results of the Non-
SOE subsample analysis and Columns (5) to (8) show the results of SOE subsample analysis. 




The positive coefficient on Finance Expert is significant in Columns (1) and (5), indicating 
financial expert CEOs spend more on capital investment in both private firms and SOEs. In 
addition, Finance Expert is positively related to R&D expenses and significant at the 1% level 
in Column (2), suggesting expert CEOs are associated with higher R&D investment in private 
firms. However, in SOEs as reported in Column (6), Finance Expert is negatively associated 
with R&D expenses, implying expert CEOs are associated with lower R&D investment when 
political intervention is stronger. 
Adding the interaction terms Finance Expert×CF and Finance Expert×Q in Columns (3), 
(4), (7) and (8), we find that in private firms, expert CEOs are associated with higher R&D 
expenses if internally generated cash flows are sufficient, as shown in Column (4), confirming 
that expert CEOs are cautious when investing in R&D, even though they are expected to have 
better access to external financing. In addition, expert CEOs strengthen the R&D investment-
Q sensitivity in private firms as shown in Column (4), suggesting the efficiency of expert CEO 
in private firms when making R&D investment. The coefficient on Finance Expert×Q in 
Column (8) suggests that expert CEOs in SOEs are negatively sensitive to Q when making 
R&D decisions. We argue this result indicates that expert CEOs in SOEs are affected by 
political objectives and therefore they are less able to make efficient R&D investment decisions 
in SOEs. 
Taken all together, the results reported in Table 6 indicate that financial expert CEOs are 
sensitive to political intervention when laying out R&D investment policies and behave 
differently in private firms and SOEs, which is consistent with our expectations. In private 
firms, financial expert CEOs spend more on R&D expenditure and they exhibit a higher R&D 
investment-Q sensitivity, which is in line with the argument that expert CEOs invest in R&D 
to improve their competitive advantages (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006). Contrarily, financial 




expert CEOs are associated with less R&D expenditure in SOEs in which political intervention 
is stronger. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
4.4.2 The anti-corruption shock 
Our second test concerning political intervention employs the anti-corruption campaign to 
examine whether political policy shock influences expert CEOs’ decision-making. We 
introduce a new control variable Anticorruption to capture the impact of President Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign on firm investment decisions, which is a dummy variable that equals one 
if the observation year is 2013 and onwards, otherwise zero.   
Figures I & II show the average investment expenditure and R&D expenses of sample 
firms surrounding the anti-corruption shock. We create a seven-year event window from the 
year 2009 to the year 2015, representing a three-year window before the anti-corruption shock 
(2009 to 2011) and a three-year window after the anti-corruption shock (2013 to 2015). The 
treatment group refers to the firms with a financial expert CEO, while the control group refers 
to the firms with a non-financial expert CEO. It shows that both the treatment and control 
groups reduce the investment expenditures after 2013, and the control group demonstrates a 
sharper decline. Both the treatment and control groups increase R&D investment throughout 
the period from 2009 to 2015, while the treatment group shows a greater increase after 2013. 
According to Paunov (2016) and Xu and Yano (2017), the anti-corruption campaign is 
associated with more innovative activities, because it reduces the costs of innovation such as 
bribes for granting patents from authorities. 
Insert Figures I & II about here 
To study the impact of the anti-corruption campaign, we first apply the difference-in-
difference (DiD) estimators to examine the investment decision changes surrounding the anti-




corruption shock. Table 7 reports the results. Panel A refers to the results using the sample 
consisting of a three-year window before the anti-corruption shock and a three-year window 
after the anti-corruption shock. Both SOEs and private firms are included in Panel A analysis. 
Column (1) reports the average change of investment expenditure (R&D expenses) after and 
before the anti-corruption shock for the treatment group (firms with expert CEOs). Column (2) 
reports the changes for the control group (firms without expert CEOs). The DiD estimators are 
reported in Column (3). First, we find that investment expenditure of both treatment and control 
groups decrease after the shock, although the decrease is not significant in the treatment group. 
More importantly, the decrease in investment expenditure is statistically larger for the control 
group than for the treatment group, captured by the DiD estimator that is statistically significant 
at the 1% level in Column (3). This result indicates having a financial expert CEO tend to 
mitigate the decreases in investment expenditure due to the anti-corruption shock. Secondly, 
we find that R&D expenses of both groups significantly increase after the shock, indicating the 
anti-corruption campaign promotes R&D intensity in Chinese listed firms in general. 
Additionally, the increase in R&D expenses is larger for the treatment group than for the control 
group, although the DiD estimator is not statistically significant. 
Panels B and C report the results using the SOE subsample and non-SOE subsample, 
respectively. Panel B shows that, in SOEs, investment expenditure of treatment and control 
groups both decrease after the anti-corruption shock, while R&D expenses of both groups 
increase following the shock. Panel C shows that there is a significant decrease in investment 
expenditure in the control group. The DiD estimator in Column (3) is significant at the 1% 
level, indicating having a financial expert CEO in private firms mitigates the decreases in 
investment expenditure following the anti-corruption shock. In addition, we find R&D 
expenses significantly increase in both treatment and control groups after the shock in private 
firms.  




The results in Table 7 indicate that the anti-corruption shock reduces (promotes) capital 
investment (R&D intensity) in Chinese listed firms in general. However, having a financial 
expert CEO is likely to mitigate the decreases in investment expenditure due to the anti-
corruption shock. Further, the DiD estimation indicates that expert CEO in SOEs are more 
sensitive to the political shock than those in private firms. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
As discussed, the anti-corruption campaign provides an exogenous shock to test the impact 
of political policy shock on top executives’ behaviour. In Table 8, we further examine the anti-
corruption campaign effect by adding the interactions Anticorruption × State, Anticorruption× 
Finance Expert, and Anticorruption× State × Finance Expert, respectively. 
The OLS regression is shown in Model 2.1-2.3 as below controlling for firm fixed effects, 
where the dependent variable is INV or R&D Expenses. We also control for Industry × Year 
fixed effects in Table 8.  
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽4𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 × 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗
+ ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗                                                                                                                (2.1) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽4𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 × 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗
+ ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗                                                                                                               (2.2) 





= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽4𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 × 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 × 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙
+ ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 + ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗                                                                                (2.3) 
Columns (1) to (3) refer to the results when investment expenditure is employed as the 
dependent variable. First, the coefficients on Anticorruption in Columns (1) to (3) are all 
negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that firms reduce their investment 
expenditure in the post-campaign period. This finding is also consistent with the results in 
Table 7. In addition, the coefficient on Anticorruption × State in Column (1) is negative and 
significant at the 5% level, suggesting that compared with private-owned companies, SOEs 
significantly reduce investment expenditure in the post-campaign period. Second, we find that 
the coefficients on Finance Expert are all significant and positive in Columns (1) to (3), 
indicating that expert CEOs are associated with higher investment expenditure. However, in 
Column (2) the coefficient on the interaction Anticorruption × Finance Expert becomes 
insignificant, suggesting that expert CEOs are less likely to invest more in the post-campaign 
period.  In Column (3), the coefficients on Anticorruption × State × Financial Expert is 
negative although insignificant, which indicates that financial expert CEOs are sensitive to the 
anti-corruption shock and less likely to invest more in SOEs. That is, the anti-corruption 
campaign reduces expert CEOs’ incentives to invest more on capital investment, especially in 
SOEs. 
The impact of the anti-corruption campaign on R&D investment are shown in Columns 
(4) to (6). In line with the results in Table 7, the campaign is associated with more R&D 
investment as the coefficients on Anticorruption are all positively significant at the 1% level in 
Columns (4) to (6). This is consistent with Paunov (2016) and Xu and Yano (2017), suggesting 
that the anti-corruption campaign encourages investment in innovation. In addition, we also 




find evidence that financial expert CEOs are sensitive to the anti-corruption campaign. For 
example, in Column (6), Finance Expert is positively related to R&D Expenses, but the three-
way interaction is significantly and negatively related to R&D Expenses. This finding implies 
that expert CEOs in SOEs tend to be less likely to invest more on R&D after the anti-corruption 
shock. 
Overall, the results in Table 8 indicate that the anti-corruption campaign reduces capital 
investment but promotes innovation activities, which is in line with the preliminary findings in 
Table 7 and supports H3a.  The impact of the anti-corruption campaign is different in SOEs 
and private-owned companies. The anti-corruption campaign reduces investment expenditure 
and the effect is more pronounced in SOEs, which have strong political objectives, than in 
private-owned companies. In addition, although the campaign promotes innovation in general, 
in SOEs, expert CEOs have less incentives to invest more on R&D after the anti-corruption 
shock. We argue that those results could be due to the political goals associated with SOEs, 
and therefore, expert CEOs in SOEs tend to be less likely to invest more on R&D after the anti-
corruption shock.  
Insert Table 8 about here 
4.5. Endogeneity  
Establishing a causal relationship between financial expert CEOs and corporate 
investment decisions is challenging. Similar to Chen et al. (2017), Mishra (2014) and many 
corporate finance studies, reverse causality, sample selection bias and omitted variable issues 
can also be the concerns in this study although firm, industry and year fixed effects are 
controlled for in the baseline regression. For example, unobserved factors that affect the 
presence of financial expert CEOs may also be related to investment decisions. In addition, 




finance expert CEOs may prefer to join firms with higher investment expenditure. The lack of 
pure random assignment of financial expert CEOs is also another endogeneity concern. 
4.5.1 Propensity Score Matching approach 
Considering the possible lack of random assignment of financial expert CEOs, we perform 
the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) procedure to address this 
type of selection concern. 
Column (1) of Panel A in Table 9 presents a probit model to predict the likelihood of 
having a financial expert CEO using the sample of 18,222 firm-year observations. We estimate 
the likelihood by incorporating firm-specific variables, e.g., State, CF, Q, Size, ROA, Stock 
Return, List Age, Concentration, as well as industry and year dummies. We control for Board 
Size, Board Independence, Chairman Exp and Director Exp. This is due to the intuition that 
board composition may also influence the recruitment of CEOs. The aim of the propensity 
score method is to produce two statistically similar samples with and without financial expert 
CEOs, respectively. The probit regression specification is shown in Eq. (3) below: 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + +𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽10𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽12𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖
+ ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 + ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑘                                                                                   (3) 
As shown in Column (1), the likelihood of having a financial expert CEO is significantly 
higher in firms if the Chairman of the board has financial background.  In addition, firm-level 
variables, e.g., Board Independence, Size and List Age are also significant factors that influence 
the presence of a financial expert CEO.  




We then use the propensity scores predicted from Column (1) of Panel A to perform a 
one-to-one PSM procedure and end up with the treatment group with a financial expert CEO 
and the control group with a non-financial expert CEO, which consists of 5,716 firm-year 
observations in total. The PSM sample enables us to compare the treatment group to the 
statistically similar control group using a matching algorithm.  
We re-run the probit model using the propensity score matched sample and report the 
results in Panel A of Table 9. As shown in Column (2), none of the independent variables is 
statistically significant. Also, the coefficient estimates in Column (2) are generally much 
smaller in magnitude than those reported in Column (1), suggesting that the results in Column 
(2) are not simply due to the drop in sample size. Moreover, the pseudo‐R2 drops from 8.93% 
prior to the propensity score matching to 0.08% following the matching. The χ2 test for overall 
model fitness shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all of the coefficient estimates 
on independent variables are zero (with a p‐value of 0.946). We also perform t-test comparing 
the differences in the treatment and control groups for robustness check, especially to check 
the results with those reported in Panel B of Table 1. The results reported in Panel B of Table 
9 confirm that the differences between the two subsamples with/without expert CEOs reported 
in Table 1 become insignificant using the PSM sample. These results suggest that these two 
groups of firms tend to be randomly assigned to the treatment (having a financial expert CEO) 
in the PSM sample. 
Panel C of Table 9 presents the OLS regression analyses of the impact of financial expert 
CEOs on investment decisions by using the PSM sample. The results in Column (1) confirm 
the significantly positive relation between expertise CEOs and investment expenditure. It is 
possible that investment expenditure is influenced by previous investment decisions. As such, 
we control for investment expenditures from the prior year and two years for robustness. The 




results are quantitatively similar to those reported in Column (1) (the results are not tabulated 
and available on request).  
Column (2) of Panel C presents the impact of financial expert CEOs on R&D expenses by 
using the PSM sample. Finance Expert is positively related to R&D Expenses.6  In Columns 
(3) and (4), we add the interactions Finance Expert × CF and Finance Expert × Q in the 
regression where the dependent variable is INV and R&D Expenses, respectively.7 It shows that 
the coefficient on Finance Expert is positively significant at the 5% level when INV is used as 
the dependent variable in Column (3). The coefficients on Finance Expert × CF and Finance 
Expert × Q are both insignificant, indicating expert CEOs are not sensitive to CF and Q when 
making capital investment decisions. In Column (4), we find a significant coefficient on 
Finance Expert × CF, indicating expert CEOs are sensitive to CF when making R&D 
investment decisions. 
We add State × CF and State × Q in Columns (5) and (6) to test whether SOEs are 
sensitive to internally generated cash flows and growth opportunities when making capital 
expenditure/R&D decisions. We find state control is sensitive to CF when making capital 
investment decisions, while negatively sensitive to Q when making R&D investment. This 
result confirms the result in Table 2 about the inefficiency of SOEs surrounding innovation 
decision-making. 
Insert Table 9 about here 
4.5.2 The Heckman two-stage analysis approach 
 
6 We use Total Intangible as the dependent variable and find similar results. The coefficient of 
Finance Expert is negative and significant at the 5% level. The result is not tabulated and available on 
request. 
7 We use Total Intangible as the dependent variable and do not find any significant results on the 
interactions.   




We employ the Heckman two-stage procedure to address the concern that the observed 
association between financial expert CEOs and investment decision is due to self-selection bias. 
The first stage regression analysis is the same as those reported in Column (1) of Table 9 (Panel 
A), which predicts the likelihood of recruiting financial expert CEOs (the probit first-stage 
equation). We then estimate the inverse Mills ratio (Mills) and include the Mills ratio along 
with other control variables to construct the second stage estimations. In Column (1) of Table 
10, the positive coefficient on Finance Expert is significant at the 1% level, suggesting a 
positive association between financial expert CEOs and investment expenditure. Similar to the 
results as reported in the Columns (3) to (6) in Panel C of Table 9, expert CEOs are not sensitive 
to CF and Q when making capital investment decisions but are sensitive to CF when making 
R&D expenditure decisions. State control is sensitive to CF when making capital investment 
decisions, while SOEs are negatively sensitive to CF and Q when making R&D expenditure 
decisions. 
Insert Table 10 about here 
5. Conclusion 
This study investigates the impact of financial expert CEOs and political influence on firm 
investment policies. We find that financial expert CEOs are associated with more investment 
expenditure in general. In particular, we provide evidence that CEOs are sensitive to political 
influence when making investment decisions. First, we find that financial expert CEOs behave 
differently regarding innovative activities in SOEs and private-owned firms. That is, they tend 
to spend more on R&D in private firms but less in SOEs. In addition, we find that financial 
expert CEOs are more likely to make efficient R&D investment decisions in private firms, but 
not in SOEs. Second, we show that the anti-corruption campaign reduces firms’ investment 
expenditure but encourages innovative activities in general. However, financial expert CEOs 




become more conservative in the post-anti-corruption period, they are less likely to investment 
more on capital and innovative activities.  This finding suggests that financial expert CEOs’ 
decisions are affected by political policy shock. Overall, our results highlight the impact of 
political intervention on expert CEOs’ decision-making. 
We also add new evidence on the impact of state control on firm investment decisions. 
We find state control is negatively related to investment expenditure, indicating the 
conservativism of state ownership. We test the cash flow-investment and growth opportunity-
investment sensitivity of state-controlled firms.  The results show that state control is 
negatively sensitive to growth opportunities when making R&D investment decisions, 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of key variables 
Panel A reports the summary statistics of the key variables included in the analysis. CEO Age refers to 
the age of the CEO. CEO Tenure refers to the number of years the CEO has been in the CEO position. 
List Age refers to the number of years that the firm has been listed. Panel B reports the t-test results of 
the subsamples with and without financial expert CEOs. Non-expert refers to the subsample without 
expert CEOs, Expert refers to the subsample with expert CEOs. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The description of other variables is 
summarized in Appendix A.  
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variables obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables      
INV 18,222 0.0639 0.0734 -0.1773 0.4928 
Buy Ratio 18,222 0.0675 0.0726 0.0000 0.4932 
Sell Ratio 18,222 0.0036 0.0122 0.0000 0.2166 
AdjINV-Over 18,222 0.3553 0.4786 0.0000 1.0000 
SimINV-Over 18,222 0.4256 0.4945 0.0000 1.0000 
R&D Expenses 18,222 0.0083 0.0166 0.0000 0.3332 
Intangible Assets 18,222 0.0091 0.0179 0.0000 0.4182 
Computerized Information 18,222 0.0001 0.0040 0.0000 0.4182 
Innovation Property 18,222 0.0088 0.0173 0.0000 0.3332 
Economic Competencies 18,222 0.0002 0.0026 0.0000 0.2647 
      
Variables of interest      
Finance Expert 18,222 0.1568 0.3637 0.0000 1.0000 
State 18,222 0.4892 0.4999 0.0000 1.0000 
Anticorruption 18,222 0.4667 0.4989 0.0000 1.0000 
      
Controls      
CEO Age 18,222 48.3294 6.5519 25.0001 79.0002 
CEO Gender 18,222 0.9453 0.2273 0.0000 1.0000 
CEO Duality 18,222 0.2291 0.4203 0.0000 1.0000 
CEO Tenure 18,222 3.5940 2.9379 1.0000 20.0000 
CF 18,222 0.0526 0.0901 -0.3450 0.4480 
Q 18,222 1.9717 1.1914 0.2002 8.9891 
Size 18,222 21.8630 1.2496 18.4966 26.0969 
ROA 18,222 0.0331 0.0575 -0.3483 0.2131 
Stock Return 18,222 0.0031 0.0082 -0.0091 0.2153 
List Age 18,222 9.2060 5.8888 1.0000 26.0001 
Concentrate 18,222 0.3790 0.1568 0.0000 0.8999 
Board Size 18,222 2.1754 0.2054 1.3863 2.9444 
Board Independence 18,222 0.3653 0.0551 0.0000 0.8000 
Chairman Exp 18,222 0.1664 0.3725 0.0000 1.0000 
Director Exp 18,222 0.4043 0.4908 0.0000 1.0000 
 
Panel B: t-test 
Variables Non-
expert 
Mean1 Expert Mean2 Mean Diff 
Mean1- 
Mean2 




INV 15,364 0.0646 2,858 0.0598 0.0048*** 
Buy Ratio 15,364 0.0681 2,858 0.0640 0.0042*** 
Sell Ratio 15,364 0.0035 2,858 0.0040 -0.0005* 
AdjINV-Over 15,364 0.3578 2,858 0.3415 0.0164* 
SimINV-Over 15,364 0.4199 2,858 0.4566 -0.0367*** 
R&D Expenses 15,364 0.0083 2,858 0.0083 0.0000 
Intangible Assets 15,364 0.0091 2,858 0.0087 0.0004 
Computerized Information 15,364 0.0001 2,858 0.0001 0.0000 
Innovation Property 15,364 0.0089 2,858 0.0083 0.0005 
Economic Competencies 15,364 0.0002 2,858 0.0003 -0.0001** 
State 15,364 0.4937 2,858 0.4755 0.0162 
CF 15,364 0.0530 2,858 0.0500 0.0031* 
Q 15,364 1.9457 2,858 2.1113 -0.1656*** 
Size 15,364 21.8349 2,858 22.0143 -0.1794*** 
ROA 15,364 0.0327 2,858 0.0352 -0.0025** 
Stock Return 15,364 0.0030 2,858 0.0033 -0.0003* 
List Age 15,364 1.9015 2,858 2.1191 -0.2176*** 
Concentrate 15,364 0.3810 2,858 0.3683 0.0128*** 
Board Size 15,364 2.1780 2,858 2.1617 0.0163*** 
Board Independence 15,364 0.3641 2,858 0.3714 -0.0073*** 
Chairman Exp 15,364 0.1216 2,858 0.4073 -0.2856*** 
Director Exp 15,364 0.3957 2,858 0.4503 -0.0546*** 
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Table 2. Financial expert CEOs and investment expenditure  
This table presents the OLS regressions of the impact of financial expert CEOs on investment 
expenditure measures. Note: t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The description of the variables is summarized in Appendix 
A. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables INV Buy Ratio Sell Ratio 
Finance Expert 0.0062*** 0.0060*** 0.0002 
 (3.133) (3.067) (0.467) 
State -0.0158*** -0.0158*** 0.0001 
 (-5.595) (-5.635) (0.265) 
CF 0.0724*** 0.0637*** -0.0093*** 
 (11.468) (10.191) (-7.475) 
Q 0.0029*** 0.0026*** -0.0004*** 
 (4.779) (4.343) (-3.254) 
Size 0.0184*** 0.0161*** -0.0028*** 
 (16.587) (14.701) (-12.768) 
ROA 0.1214*** 0.1416*** 0.0194*** 
 (11.467) (13.517) (9.315) 
Stock Return -0.1344** -0.1126* 0.0250** 
 (-2.190) (-1.854) (2.068) 
List Age -0.0368*** -0.0345*** 0.0024*** 
 (-21.427) (-20.328) (7.077) 
Concentrate 0.0040 -0.0022 -0.0054*** 
 (0.629) (-0.355) (-4.345) 
Board Size 0.0016 -0.0003 -0.0020** 
 (0.354) (-0.074) (-2.191) 
Board Independence 0.0172 0.0252* 0.0054** 
 (1.293) (1.907) (2.049) 
Chairman Exp -0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 
 (-0.088) (0.010) (0.752) 
Director Exp 0.0013 0.0018* 0.0004** 
 (1.251) (1.703) (2.099) 
CEO Age 0.0064 0.0036 -0.0025** 
 (1.204) (0.681) (-2.418) 
CEO Gender -0.0011 0.0001 0.0010 
 (-0.338) (0.044) (1.530) 
CEO Duality 0.0009 0.0017 0.0007** 
 (0.511) (0.977) (2.061) 
CEO Tenure -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0002 
 (-0.657) (-0.958) (-1.171) 
Intercept -0.1655*** -0.0965*** 0.0751*** 
 (-5.620) (-3.313) (12.963) 
Observations 18,222 18,222 18,222 
Adjusted R-squared 0.361 0.362 0.103 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry×Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3. Financial expert CEOs and overinvestment  
This table presents the results of probit regressions of the relation between financial expert CEOs and 
overinvestment. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. The description of the variables is summarized in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables AdjINV-Over SimINV-Over AdjINV-Over-75 SimINV-Over-75 
Finance Expert 0.0156 0.0625** 0.0457 0.0107 
 (0.363) (2.028) (1.020) (0.321) 
State -0.0466 0.0289 -0.0352 0.0219 
 (-1.262) (1.326) (-0.915) (0.902) 
CF 2.1667*** -1.8775*** 2.4082*** -0.6266*** 
 (14.813) (-15.042) (15.474) (-4.752) 
Q -0.0236* 0.0046 -0.0357*** -0.0190 
 (-1.817) (0.435) (-2.590) (-1.629) 
Size 0.1247*** 0.0500*** 0.0992*** 0.0234** 
 (8.070) (5.146) (6.350) (2.195) 
ROA 1.7904*** 3.3121*** 1.2590*** 2.7062*** 
 (7.167) (15.311) (4.881) (11.740) 
Stock Return 1.4762 -4.9843*** 0.4112 -3.7338*** 
 (1.206) (-3.972) (0.310) (-2.780) 
List Age -0.3618*** 0.0000 -0.3547*** -0.0486*** 
 (-18.023) (0.001) (-17.243) (-3.378) 
Concentrate -0.2998*** -0.1065* -0.2499** -0.1577** 
 (-2.899) (-1.700) (-2.314) (-2.268) 
Board Size 0.2040** 0.0185 0.1608* 0.0874 
 (2.386) (0.334) (1.778) (1.473) 
Board Independence 0.3706 0.1131 0.1781 0.0992 
 (1.313) (0.569) (0.609) (0.456) 
Chairman Exp -0.0048 0.0263 0.0082 0.0176 
 (-0.121) (0.961) (0.193) (0.602) 
Director Exp -0.0219 0.0118 -0.0166 0.0161 
 (-0.944) (0.570) (-0.702) (0.729) 
CEO Age 0.0298 0.1010 -0.0181 0.0787 
 (0.287) (1.374) (-0.163) (0.995) 
CEO Gender 0.0403 -0.0298 0.0244 0.0146 
 (0.601) (-0.656) (0.331) (0.295) 
CEO Duality 0.0644* 0.0448* 0.1013*** 0.0353 
 (1.872) (1.854) (2.782) (1.311) 
CEO Tenure 0.0130 0.0060 -0.0247 -0.0581*** 
 (0.763) (0.396) (-1.394) (-3.693) 
Intercept -3.1751*** -1.7627*** -2.5603*** -1.5296*** 
 (-6.274) (-5.101) (-4.872) (-4.167) 
Observations 18,222 18,222 18,222 18,222 
Pseudo R-squared 0.075 0.022 0.075 0.012 
Firm fixed effects No No No No 
Industry×Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4. Financial expert CEOs and intangible investment  
This table presents the OLS regressions of the impact of financial expert CEOs on intangible investment measures. Note: t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). The description of the variables is summarized in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables R&D Expenses Intangible Assets Computerized Info Innovation Property Economic Competencies 
Finance Expert -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0002*** 
 (-0.231) (-0.815) (-0.858) (-1.366) (2.848) 
State 0.0007 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0008* -0.0004*** 
 (1.534) (0.755) (-0.837) (1.673) (-3.054) 
CF 0.0064*** 0.0076*** 0.0005** 0.0063*** 0.0008*** 
 (6.123) (6.426) (2.278) (5.628) (2.880) 
Q 0.0006*** 0.0008*** 0.0000* 0.0008*** 0.0000 
 (6.233) (7.339) (1.931) (6.960) (1.574) 
Size 0.0016*** 0.0014*** 0.0000 0.0015*** -0.0001** 
 (8.607) (6.894) (0.069) (7.783) (-2.388) 
ROA 0.0120*** 0.0101*** -0.0002 0.0101*** 0.0002 
 (6.882) (5.112) (-0.494) (5.343) (0.476) 
Stock Return -0.0592*** -0.0623*** -0.0032 -0.0574*** -0.0018 
 (-5.833) (-5.453) (-1.528) (-5.267) (-0.690) 
List Age 0.0026*** 0.0021*** -0.0000 0.0022*** -0.0001 
 (9.083) (6.412) (-0.852) (7.071) (-0.779) 
Concentrate 0.0002 0.0016 0.0002 0.0015 -0.0000 
 (0.159) (1.336) (0.740) (1.298) (-0.156) 
Board Size -0.0001 -0.0014 0.0002 -0.0017** 0.0001 
 (-0.169) (-1.584) (1.331) (-2.038) (0.528) 
Board Independence -0.0086*** -0.0107*** 0.0002 -0.0109*** 0.0000 
 (-3.906) (-4.290) (0.440) (-4.599) (0.069) 
Chairman Exp -0.0007** -0.0012*** 0.0001 -0.0011*** -0.0001 
 (-2.223) (-3.167) (0.863) (-3.136) (-1.476) 
Director Exp 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.178) (-0.076) (0.813) (-0.429) (0.824) 
CEO Age 0.0003 0.0008 -0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 
 (0.326) (0.780) (-0.001) (0.801) (0.073) 




CEO Gender 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 
 (1.000) (0.387) (1.623) (0.381) (-1.192) 
CEO Duality -0.0006** -0.0010*** -0.0001 -0.0009*** -0.0001 
 (-2.117) (-3.026) (-1.119) (-2.738) (-0.947) 
CEO Tenure 0.0007*** 0.0007*** -0.0000 0.0007*** 0.0000 
 (5.464) (4.580) (-0.724) (4.857) (0.355) 
Intercept -0.0465*** -0.0501*** -0.0016 -0.0489*** 0.0003 
 (-9.561) (-9.131) (-1.568) (-9.342) (0.258) 
Observations 18,222 18,222 18,222 18,222 18,222 
Adjusted R-squared 0.660 0.629 0.752 0.637 0.095 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry×Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5. Financial expert CEOs and investment efficiency  
This table presents the OLS regressions of the impact of financial expert CEOs on investment decisions. 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. The description of the variables is summarized in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables INV INV R&D Expenses R&D Expenses 
Finance Expert 0.0095*** 0.0062*** -0.0010* -0.0001 
 (2.949) (3.126) (-1.916) (-0.226) 
State -0.0159*** -0.0207*** 0.0007 0.0016*** 
 (-5.598) (-5.941) (1.540) (2.709) 
CF 0.0744*** 0.0559*** 0.0055*** 0.0090*** 
 (10.828) (6.504) (4.830) (6.317) 
Q 0.0032*** 0.0024*** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 
 (4.839) (3.414) (5.156) (6.374) 
Finance Expert × CF -0.0115  0.0052**  
 (-0.766)  (2.103)  
Finance Expert × Q -0.0013  0.0003*  
 (-1.105)  (1.723)  
State × CF  0.0343***  -0.0053*** 
  (2.835)  (-2.670) 
State × Q  0.0017*  -0.0003* 
  (1.655)  (-1.835) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,222 18,222 18,222 18,222 
Adjusted R-squared 0.361 0.362 0.660 0.660 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry×Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6. Financial expert CEO and investment expenditure, state verses private firms  
This table presents sub-sample analyses of the impact of financial expert CEOs on investment decisions. Non-SOE refers to the subsample of firms with the 
ultimate controller from private sector.  SOE refers to the subsample of firms with the ultimate controller as a SOE or government agency. Note: t-statistics in 
parentheses for OLS regressions. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The description of the variables is summarized 
in Appendix A.  
 
 
 Non-SOE SOE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 








         
Finance Expert 0.0062** 0.0016*** 0.0089* -0.0012 0.0063** -0.0010*** 0.0089* 0.0009 
 (2.067) (2.739) (1.898) (-1.318) (2.276) (-2.631) (1.874) (1.305) 
CF 0.0557*** 0.0091*** 0.0588*** 0.0070*** 0.0804*** 0.0024* 0.0798*** 0.0030** 
 (6.389) (5.497) (6.211) (3.894) (8.634) (1.856) (7.868) (2.151) 
Q 0.0024*** 0.0005*** 0.0026*** 0.0003* 0.0040*** 0.0007*** 0.0043*** 0.0009*** 
 (2.990) (3.046) (2.991) (1.671) (3.909) (5.219) (3.896) (6.058) 
Finance Expert×CF   -0.0182 0.0125***   0.0024 -0.0038 
   (-0.860) (3.121)   (0.113) (-1.273) 
Finance Expert×Q   -0.0008 0.0009***   -0.0015 -0.0009*** 
   (-0.546) (3.210)   (-0.726) (-3.294) 
         
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,308 9,308 9,308 9,308 8,914 8,914 8,914 8,914 
Adjusted R-squared 0.398 0.683 0.398 0.684 0.347 0.535 0.347 0.536 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry×Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Figures I and II. The impact of President Xi’s anti-corruption campaign on investment 
decisions 
Figures I and II shows the average investment expenditure and R&D expenses for treatment (firms with 
expert CEOs) and control firms (firms without expert CEOs) surrounding the anticorrutption shock, 
respectively. A seven-year event window from year 2009 to year 2015 is created with a three-year 
window before the anti-corruption shook (2009 to 2011) and a three-year window after the anti-






















Table 7. The impact of President Xi’s anti-corruption campaign on investment decisions 
This table presents the impact of President Xi’s anti-corruption campaign on investment expenditure 
and R&D expenses using the difference-in-difference estimator (DiD). Note: t-statistics in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The 
description of the variables is summarized in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: SOE & Non-SOE 











Investment expenditure -0.004 -0.018*** 0.014*** 
 (1.10) (-10.75) (3.42) 
R&D expenses 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.001 
  8.81 (18.23) (0.53) 
 
Panel B: SOE  











Investment expenditure -0.016*** -0.024*** 0.008 
 (3.32) (-10.54) (1.38) 
R&D expenses 0.003*** 0.005*** -0.001 
  (3.21) (9.51) (1.05) 
 
Panel C: Non-SOE 











Investment expenditure 0.004 -0.016*** 0.020*** 
 (0.75) (-6.54) (3.36) 
R&D expenses 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.002 





Table 8. The impact of President Xi’s anti-corruption campaign on investment decisions 
This table presents the impact of President Xi’s anti-corruption campaign on investment decisions using the OLS analysis. Note: t-statistics in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The description of the variables is summarized in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables INV INV INV R&D Expenses R&D Expenses R&D Expenses 
       
Finance Expert 0.0058*** 0.0058** 0.0069*** -0.0001 0.0003 0.0005 
 (2.935) (2.313) (3.168) (-0.192) (0.774) (1.525) 
Anticorruption -0.0068*** -0.0090*** -0.0087*** 0.0013*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 
 (-3.681) (-5.397) (-5.386) (4.169) (3.818) (4.259) 
State -0.0138*** -0.0155*** -0.0152*** 0.0009* 0.0007 0.0009* 
 (-4.713) (-5.460) (-5.328) (1.949) (1.462) (1.843) 
Anticorruption× State -0.0049**   -0.0008**   
 (-2.331)   (-2.204)   
Anticorruption× Finance Expert  0.0002   -0.0007  
  (0.081)   (-1.445)  
Anticorruption× State × Finance Expert    -0.0036   -0.0023*** 
   (-1.073)   (-4.093) 
       
Observations 18,222 18,222 18,222 18,222 18,222 18,222 
Adjusted R-squared 0.363 0.362 0.363 0.661 0.661 0.661 
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry×Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 9. Financial expert CEOs and investment decision, the propensity score matching 
approach 
Panel A of this table presents the results of probit regressions of the determinants of having a financial 
expert CEO on the board.  The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the CEO of the firm is a 
financial expert. Permatch refers to the whole sample of 18,222 observations. Postmatch refers to the 
propensity score matched sample of 5,716 observations. Note: robust z-statistics in parentheses for 
probit regressions. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. The description of the variables is summarized in Appendix A. 
Panel A  
  Dummy = 1 if in treatment group; 0 if in control group 
Variables （1） （2） 
  Prematch Postmatch 
State -0.0870*** -0.0090 
 
(-3.21) (-0.24) 
CF -0.1767 -0.0405 
 
(-1.29) (-0.22) 
Q 0.0478*** -0.0405 
 
(4.30) (-0.22) 
Size 0.0507*** -0.0130 
 
(4.48) (-0.81) 
ROA 0.4980** -0.1814 
 
(2.13) (-0.54) 
Stock Return 0.5515 -1.0772 
 
(0.37) (-0.54) 
List Age 0.1471*** 0.0150 
 
(8.68) (0.62) 
Concentrate -0.0401 0.0202 
 
(-0.50) (0.18) 
Board Size -0.0429 -0.0962 
 
(-0.63) (-0.99) 
Board Independence 0.8119*** -0.2814 
 
(3.37) (-0.85) 
Chairman Exp 0.8810*** 0.0088 
 
(32.62) (0.26) 
Director Exp 0.0424* 0.0152 
 
(1.75) (0.45) 
Intercept 0.0012*** -1.7627*** 
 (-6.274) (-5.101) 
Observations 18,222 5,716 
p‐value of χ2 0.0000 0.9458 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0893 0.0008 
Firm fixed effects No No 
Industry×Year effects Yes Yes 
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Non-expert Mean1 Expert Mean2 Mean Diff 
Mean1-Mean2  
 
     
INV 2,858 0.0586 2,858 0.0598 -0.0012 
Buy Ratio 2,858 0.0623 2,858 0.0640 -0.0016 
Sell Ratio 2,858 0.0037 2,858 0.0040 -0.0003 
AdjINV-Over 2,858 0.3411 2,858 0.3415 -0.0003 
SimINV-Over 2,858 0.4426 2,858 0.4566 -0.0140 
R&D Expenses 2,858 0.0081 2,858 0.0083 -0.0002 
Intangible Assets 2,858 0.0090 2,858 0.0087 0.0003 
Computerized Information 2,858 0.0002 2,858 0.0001 0.0002 
Innovation Property 2,858 0.0086 2,858 0.0083 0.0002 
Economic Competencies 2,858 0.0002 2,858 0.0003 -0.0001 
CF 2,858 0.0511 2,858 0.0500 0.0011 
Q 2,858 2.0953 2,858 2.1113 -0.0160 
Size 2,858 22.0561 2,858 22.0143 0.0419 
ROA 2,858 0.0364 2,858 0.0352 0.0012 
Stock Return 2,858 0.0035 2,858 0.0033 0.0001 
List Age 2,858 2.1158 2,858 2.1191 -0.0033 
Concentrate 2,858 0.3692 2,858 0.3683 0.0009 
Board Size 2,858 2.1676 2,858 2.1617 0.0059 
Board Independence 2,858 0.3721 2,858 0.3714 0.0006 
Chairman Exp 2,858 0.4041 2858 0.4073 -0.0031 
Director Exp 2,858 0.4437 2858 0.4503 -0.0066 




Panel C of this table presents the results of the relationship between financial expert CEOs and investment decisions using the propensity score matching 
approach. Note: t-statistics in parentheses for OLS regressions. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The 
description of the variables is summarized in Appendix A.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables INV R&D Expenses INV R&D Expenses INV R&D Expenses 
Finance Expert 0.0060* 0.0015*** 0.0122** 0.0001 0.0059* 0.0015*** 
 (1.814) (2.631) (2.452) (0.080) (1.802) (2.622) 
State -0.0193*** -0.0009 -0.0192*** -0.0009 -0.0193** 0.0024* 
 (-3.011) (-0.754) (-3.000) (-0.781) (-2.555) (1.798) 
CF 0.0794*** 0.0036* 0.0972*** -0.0019 0.0602*** 0.0063** 
 (6.908) (1.761) (5.894) (-0.656) (3.846) (2.294) 
Q 0.0013 0.0004* 0.0027* 0.0001 0.0011 0.0008*** 
 (1.092) (1.755) (1.681) (0.267) (0.835) (3.468) 
Finance Expert × CF   -0.0324 0.0099***   
   (-1.522) (2.645)   
Finance Expert × Q   -0.0023 0.0005   
   (-1.314) (1.585)   
State × CF     0.0423* -0.0055 
     (1.905) (-1.404) 
State × Q     -0.0003 -0.0014*** 
     (-0.144) (-4.172) 
       
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,716 5,716 5,716 5,716 5,716 5,716 
Adjusted R-squared 0.400 0.698 0.400 0.699 0.400 0.700 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry×Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 10. Financial expert CEOs investment decision, the Heckman two-stage analysis 
This table presents the results of regressions using the Heckman two-stage analysis. Note: t-statistics in parentheses for OLS regressions. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The description of the variables is summarized in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables INV R&D Expenses INV R&D Expenses INV R&D Expenses 
Finance Expert 0.0064*** -0.0001 0.0089*** -0.0010* 0.0063*** -0.0001 
 (3.199) (-0.224) (2.757) (-1.949) (3.188) (-0.216) 
State -0.0073 0.0009 -0.0079 0.0010 -0.0122** 0.0018* 
 (-1.351) (0.956) (-1.430) (1.153) (-2.071) (1.816) 
CF 0.0895*** 0.0067*** 0.0906*** 0.0061*** 0.0721*** 0.0094*** 
 (7.963) (3.592) (7.688) (3.154) (5.727) (4.508) 
Q -0.0016 0.0006 -0.0011 0.0004 -0.0020 0.0006 
 (-0.633) (1.321) (-0.433) (0.883) (-0.769) (1.474) 
Finance Expert × CF   -0.0125 0.0052**   
   (-0.836) (2.084)   
Finance Expert × Q   -0.0009 0.0003*   
   (-0.787) (1.770)   
State × CF     0.0347*** -0.0053*** 
     (2.867) (-2.665) 
State × Q     0.0016 -0.0003* 
     (1.529) (-1.850) 
Mills Ratio -0.1211* -0.0020 -0.1138* -0.0046 -0.1167* -0.0030 
 (-1.836) (-0.183) (-1.696) (-0.419) (-1.766) (-0.273) 
       
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,222 18,222 18,222 18,222 18,222 18,222 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared 0.361 0.660 0.361 0.660 0.361 0.660 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry×Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
Appendix A reports the variables and definitions used in this study. 
Variable Name Definition 
Dependent Variable   
INV 
 (Net cash payments for fixed assets, intangible assets, and other 
long-term assets - cash receipts from selling these assets)/beginning 
total assets 
Buy Ratio 
(Cash payments for fixed assets, intangible assets, and other long-
term assets)/beginning total assets 
Sell Ratio 
(Cash receipts from selling fixed assets, intangible assets, and other 
long-term assets)/beginning total assets 
AdjINV-Over 
Dummy variable equals one if the difference between a firm's 
investment expenditure and the average industrial investment  in any 
observation year is positive and zero otherwise 
SimINV-Over 
Dummy variable equals one if the residual from the simple 
investment model is positive and zero otherwise 
R&D Expenses Research and development expenses/beginning total assets 
Intangible Assets 
(Computerized information spending + innovation property spending 
+ economic competencies spending)/beginning total assets 
Computerized Info 
(Expenses of computer software + expenses of computer 
databases)/beginning total assets 
Innovation Property 
(Science and engineering R&D costs + mineral exploration spending 
+ copyright and license costs + other product development, design, 
and research expenses)/beginning total assets 
Economic 
Competencies 
(Brand equity costs + firm-specific human capital costs + 
organizational structure costs)/beginning total assets 





Dummy variable equals one if the CEO has finance-related 
occupational background and zero otherwise 
CEO Age The natural logarithm of the age of the CEO 
CEO Gender Dummy variable equals one if CEO is male and zero otherwise 
CEO Duality 
Dummy variable equals one if CEO serves as the Chairman of the 
Board and zero otherwise 
CEO Tenure 
The natural logarithm of number of years the CEO has been in the 
CEO position 
    
State 
Dummy variable equals one if the company is defined as a state-
owned enterprise and zero otherwise 
Anticorruption 
Dummy variable equals one if the observation year is 2013 and 
onwards and zero otherwise 
    
Other Controls    
CF Net operating cash flow / beginning total assets 
Q 
Investment opportunities: (market value of tradable shares + book 
value of non-tradable shares and liabilities) / book value of total 
assets 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
ROA Net income / total assets 
Stock Return Annual stock return 
List Age Natural logarithm of the number of years that the firm has been listed 




Concentrate Shareholding percentage of the largest shareholder 
Board Size The natural logarithm of total number of directors on the board 
Board Independence The proportion of independent directors on the board 
Chairman Exp 
Dummy variable equals one if the Chairman of the board has 
financial work experience and zero otherwise 
Director Exp 
Dummy variable equals one if at least one of the independent 
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